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Corporate Distress in East Asia
The effect of currency and interest rate shocks
Stijn Claessens, This Note reports the results of a study that quantified the effect of currency and interest rate
end Giovanni shocks in East Asia on the liquidity and solvency of nonfinancial corporations in the region. In a
and Giovanni
Fenri survey of the five countries most affected by the East Asian financial crisis-Indonesia, the
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand-the study found that 63 percent of
firms are illiquid (with earnings less than their debt service) and 31 percent technically insolvent
(with financial obligations exceeding their equity).' Among solvent firms, about half are illiquid
and at risk of insolvency unless their liquidity constraints are relieved. Worst affected is
Indonesia, with 77 percent of firms illiquid (table 1). Malaysia has the fewest insolvent firms-
5 percent-but even so, 63 percent of firms are illiquid. Nonperforming loans in the five countries
could amount to 7 to 30 percent of GDP, and the share of nonperforming assets could be as high
as 64 percent of GDP in Korea, and more than a third of the combined GDP in these countries.
The study also sheds light on the high interest rate debate for each country. There is a clear
tradeoff: higher interest rates will damage profits but could help to stabilize the currency, thus
limiting the burden of external liabilities.
TABLE 1 CORPORATE AND ECONOMIC DISTRESS IN EAST ASIA, SEPTEMBER 1998
I Nonperforming Nonperforming
iIiIgI_IIdIIk loans assets
Country ,. (percentage of GDP) (percentage of GDP)
Indonesia 77 65 29.9 39.4
Korea, Rep. of 50 41 24.8 64.2
Malaysia 63 5 14.4 25.1
Philippines 57 16 7.1 10.6
Thailand 65 23 27.9 41.2
Average 63 31 20.8 36.1
Source: World Bank staff estimates.
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2 Corporate Distress in East Asia
Precrisis conditions relatively low, and while leverage in the Philip-
pines was rising, it was still much lower than in
The riskiness inherent in the liability structures Indonesia and Thailand. Most countries saw
of East Asian corporations is evident in the av- some increase in leverage in the past few years,
erage debt to equity ratios in the period before most notably Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. The
the crisis, especially when compared with those rise in leverage in the Philippines is probably
in two industrial countries, Germany and the the result of its reforms in the mid-1980s, which
United States (figure 1).2 Another comparator is revived the corporate sector and improved fi-
Taiwan (China), included in the study as a nancing possibilities.
benchmark because it has been less affected by
the crisis. High external financing, mostly from Short-term debt was high as a share of total debt
bank lending, has been a characteristic of East during the entire period in all five East Asian
Asian corporations. Korean firms had the high- countries (figure 2). Malaysia and Thailand stand
est debt to equity ratios in 1988-96, about five out with shares of about 66 percent; the others
times as high as those of Taiwanese firms, which have shares of about 58 percent. Despite all the
had the lowest. Leverage in Malaysia was also attention to the role of short-term debt in the
FIGURE 1 CORPORATE LEVERAGE, 1988-96
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East Asian financial crisis, the data do not sug- debt varied greatly across East Asian econo-
gest a massive buildup in short-term debt in the mies in 1996 (figure 3). Korean firms had the
region in the past few years. Instead, they indi- largest share of total foreign exchange debt,
cate a gradual increase over a longer period, with followed by Malaysian firms. Malaysian firms
even some decline in the past several years. Nev- had the largest share of foreign short-term debt,
ertheless. these ratios are much higher than those followed by Korean and Thai firms. And firms
in many industrial countries. In the United States, in Taiwan (China) and the Philippines had the
for example, the share of short-term debt is about largest share of domestic long-term debt.
25 percent, and in Germany it is about 45 percent.
Data also suggest large dlifferences across coun-
These short-term debt shares do not distinguish tries before the crisis in the share of earnings
foreign exchange liabilities from domestic debt, absorbed by interest payments. Taiwanese
and in some countries and times the debt com- corporations needed to devote only a small share
position may have included more short-term of earnings (before interest and taxes) to inter-
foreign exchange debt than in others. Data on est payments, about 14 percent (figure 4). Thai
debt composition shows that the structure of and Korean corporations had the highest share
FIGURE 2 CORPORATE SHORT-TERM DEBT, 1988-96
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of interest expenses, about 37 percent and 39 that firms were very vulnerable to a rise in inter-
percent. (Indonesian, Malaysian, and Philippine est rates (or a drop in earnings).
corporations averaged about 25 percent.) These
ratios are much higher than those typical in in- Currency and interest rate effects
dustrial countries. In Germany, for example,
interest payments in 1996 represented only 26 The study assessed both the combined and sepa-
percent of earnings (before interest and taxes); rate effects of the currency and interest rate
for Japanese firms interest payments averaged shocks in the second half of 1997 and in 1998
only 10 percent. The high share for interest pay- on East Asian firms' liquidity and solvency. The
ments in the five East Asian countries meant pros and cons of a high interest rate policy have
FIGURE 3 CORPORATE DEBT COMPOSITION, 1996
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FIGURE 4 INTEREST COVERAGE, 1996
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been much debated in the analysis of the East Singapore) and the onshore three-month inter-
Asian financial crisis. One aspect of that debate bank rates for the currency. The change in this
is the effect on corporate balance sheets. Here spread indicates how marginal lending rates have
a clear tradeoff exists: higher domestic interest changed (as a result of changes in the opportu-
rates will damage corporations' profitability, but nity costs of funds for banks). The study also
could help in stabilizing the country's currency, revised upward the interest rate paid on foreign
thus helping corporations by limiting the burden currency debt by a factor proportional to the
of high debt service on their external liabilities. increase in the spread between the rate on U.S.
The analysis shows the degree of tradeoff be- dollar-denominated sovereign bonds issued by
tween these two effects for each country. the country and the rate on U.S. Treasury bonds
of similar maturity.
For each country it calculated the average ex-
change rate for September 1-13, 1998, and com- The study computed the effect of the shocks in
pared that with the average exchange rate in terms of corporate financial obligations at the
March 1997, takcn as the prccrisis value. For end of 1996 using 1996 balance sheet figurcs
the interest rate shock, the study compared the and profit and loss statements. It defined firms
average domestic currency bank lending rate as technically insolvent when the increase in
over the first half of 1998 with the average lend- financial obligations calculated at new exchange
ing rate in the first half of 1997. To adjust for and interest rates exceeded equity at the end of
the fact that the bank lending rates used are 1996. And it defined firms as illiquid when 1996
average rates, not marginal rates on new loans, earnings (before interest and taxes) fell short of
it added to the postcrisis lending rate the change debt service obligations projected at new ex-
in the spread between the offshore (quoted in change and interest rates. It used three scenarios:
FIGURE 5 INSOLVENT FIRMS AFTER THE CURRENCY AND INTEREST RATE SHOCKS
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FIGURE 6 ILLIQUID FIRMS AFTER THE CURRENCY AND INTEREST RATE SHOCKS
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FIGURE 7 ILLIQUID AND INSOLVENT FIRMS AFTER THE CURRENCY AND
INTEREST RATE SHOCKS
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both exchange rate and interest rate shocks, in- hit, with 65 percent of firms estimated to be
terest rate shock only, and currency shock only. insolvent. Here, as expectecl, the damage to the
corporate sector stems mainly from the large
The study calculated the effect of the exchange depreciation of the currency, much less so from
rate shock as the increase in the value of for- the increase in interest rates, In Korea 41 per-
eign cuLrrency debt-assumed to be denomi- cent of corporations are technically insolvent.
nated entirely in 1 .S. dollars-due to the Here the effect of the currency depreciation still
domestic currency devaluationP It estimated the dominates, but the interest rate shock is also
effect of the interest rate shock by applying the important, and half the firms that are insolvent
estimated increase in domestic corporate bor- are so because of the combination of the inter-
rowing rates to debt denominated in domestic est rate and currency shocks. In Thailand about
currency,' and applying the estimated increase a quarter of firms are insolvent, most because
in corporate foreign currency borrowing rates of the exchange rate shock. No Taiwanese firm
to debt denominated in foreign currency. in the sample is technically insolvent.
The results show that after the two shocks the There can, of course, be both overlap and inter-
share of insolvent firms is 31 percent on aver- action between the two shocks. In Indonesia
age for the five most affected East Asian coun- the share of insolvent firms in the scenario with
tries (figure 5). For all five countries the currency both shocks is smaller than the sum of the shares
shock is more important than the interest rate in the scenarios with single shocks because the
shock. If only the currency shock had happened, same firms are insolvent under both shocks. In
22 percent of East Asian firms would be techni- Korea the two shocks interact, and the share of
callv insolvent. Indonesia is bv far the hardest insolvent firms in the scenario with both shocks
TABLE 2 ESTIMATED NONPERFORMING LOANS AND NONPERFORMING ASSETS AS A SHARE OF GOP,
SEPTEMBER 1998
*s Sample firms' Total Total
I nonperforming I nonperformiing nonperforming
loans . loans assets
I = (percentage (percentage ( percentage
Country of total loans) I of GOP), of GDP),
indonesia 64.8 52.6 57.0 29.9 75.0 39A4
Korea. Rep. of 40.8 38.9 64.0 24.8 165.0 642
Malaysia 4.6 15.2 95.0 14.4 165.0 25.1
Philippines 16.3 13.6 52.0 7.1 78.0 10.6
Thailand 22.9 26.6 105.0 27.9 155.0 41.2
Simple average 30.2 29.4 74.6 20.8 127.0 36.1
a. Calculated by multiplying sample firms' nonperforming loans as a percentage of total oans by total bank credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP
b. Domestic credit includes credit from nonbank financial institutions (such as insurance ompanies) and capital market instruments.
c. Calculated by multiplying sample firns' nonperforming loans as a percentage of total oans by domestic credit as a percentage of GOP.
Source:World Bank staff estimates xceptfor bank credittothe privatesector(Bankfor International Settlements 1998)and domestic credit as a share of GOP OJA
Morgan}.
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exceeds the sum of the shares in the scenarios cent), followed by Thailand (41.2 percent) and
with single shocks. Indonesia (39.4 percent). The Philippiines has
the smallest amount of nonperforming loans
Illiquidity is much more pervasive than insol- relative to GDP (10.6 percent).
vency. Even before the crisis 11 percent of Thai
firms, I15 percent of Malavsian firms, and 27 per-firms, 15 percent of Malaysian firms, and 27 per- A telated paper (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang 199&) documents the
cent of Philippine firms were illiquid (that is, performance and financing struLctuLres of East Asian corporatiors over
their earnings did not cover interest payments). the past decade. Using a database of 5,550 East Asian firms in nine
After the crisis 77 percent of Indonesian firms, CoLIntries ovet the pernod 198-p96, it identifies somte important pat-
terns across countnies. Leverage xx'as higit and increasing in Indonesia.
65 percent of Thai firms, 63 percent of Malay- Japan. Korea. and Thailand. Foreign exchange shor-term borrowing
sian firms, 57 percent of Philippine firms, and became imponant in the past few years, especially in Korea, Malaysia,
andi Thailand. These vulnerabilidtes in corportae financial structulre's50 percent of Korean firms were illiquid (figure have played an impnrtant pant in triggering and aggravating East Asta's
6). Even in Taiwan (China) about 20 percent of financial crisis, and in leading many corporations into lankrutptcy (Ferri.
firms face liquidity problems. Interestingly, in Hahm, and Bongini 1998).
mnost countries the interest shock becomes more I The data come ftont Wtorldscope and E.tel databases and are com-
piled from annual reports of the nonfinancial comnpanies listed on
important when illiquiditv is considered. the major stock exchanges in the region. The sample consists of
463 firms: 82 for Indonesia, 79 for Korea, 79 for Malaysia, 62 for the
The differences between liquidity and solvency Philippines, 99 for Thailand, andI 62 for Taiwan (China). The ex-
change rates used are from- the International Monietary Fund's In-
problems reveal important insights. The share ternational Financial Statistics and Blotmberg. The lending rates
of firms that are illiquid but technically solvent are from national sources, mostly the central bank, and the off-
is large, averaging 35 percent for the five East shore interest rates from l. Morgan, Stngapore.Viewpoint is an open ' 2 As used in this Note, the debt to equitv ratio is total debt (tong
forttm intended to Asian countries (figure 7). Thus many solvent term, short term, trade credits) over the nominal valu_le of common
encourage d ssemina- firms, unable to cover current debt service pav- equity.
lion of and debate on Data availability problems prevented the study fmron comiputinig toi
ideas, innovations, and ptents from earnings, are at risk of insolvency. i efctofthe devaluation in terms of the increaser( value of
best practices for ex- These firms may have difficulty obtaining out- assets denominated in foreign ctLrrency. Neglecting this effect could
panding the private side financing for working capital to maintain lead to overestimates of insolvency. Bat the anahlsis also neglects
sector. The views pub- the negative demnand shrock triggered by thie crisis, a shork that
lished are those of the ongoing operations, and may be operating at likelv oureighs anv positivc effect sterm ning fon revaltation of
authors and should not too low a level. Restoring credit flows to these foreign currency as.sets.
be attributed to the solvent firms is important to restart growth in 4 To account for the repricing of loans, the study applied ttie entire
World Bank or any of . increase to short-term domestic currency debt but only a third of
its affiliated organiza- these countries. the increase to long-term domestic ctinrency debt. This amsounts to
tions. Nor do any of the assuming that long-terto domestic currencv debt pays fixed rates
conclusions represent Finally, the study estimated nonperforming loans and has a three-year mnaturity. This process was repeated for for-
official policy of the and nonperforming assets as a share of GDP eign cLrrency debt.
World Bank sr of its
Executive Directors for the five most affected countries, extrapolat-
or the countries they ing from data for the firms in the sample that References
represent. cannot meet their debt service requirements Bank for International Settlements. 1998. 68tb Annual Repor. Basle,
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